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Abstract. We give a direct construction of a certificateless key encap-
sulation mechanism (KEM) in the standard model that is more efficient
than the generic constructions proposed before by Huang and Wong [10].
We use a direct construction from Kiltz and Galindo’s KEM scheme [11]
to obtain a certificateless KEM in the standard model; our construction
is roughly twice as efficient as the generic construction. We also address
the security flaw discovered by Selvi et al. [16].
1 Introduction
Certificateless encryption introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] is a
variant of identity based encryption that limits the key escrow capabilities of the
key generation centre (KGC), which are inherent in identity based encryption
[3]. Dent [8] published a survey of more than twenty certificateless encryption
schemes that focuses on the different security models and the efficiency of the re-
spective schemes. In certificateless cryptography schemes, there are three secrets
per party:
1. The key issued by the key generation centre (Dent [8] calls it “partial private
key”). We assume in the following that this key is ID-based, although it does
not necessarily have to be ID-based.
2. The user generated private key xID (Dent calls it “secret value”).
3. The ephemeral value chosen randomly for each session.
Key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) provide efficient means to com-
municate a random key from a sender to a designated receiver. Messages used
with public key encryption schemes are usually limited in length or have to be-
long to a specific group. Contrariwise, key encapsulation mechanisms encrypt
only a key that is then usually used in a symmetric data encapsulation mecha-
nism (DEM) and thus provide increased efficiency over public key encryption.
The resulting scheme is then called a hybrid encryption scheme [7,6]. Efficient
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constructions for a certificateless encryption scheme in the standard model can
be obtained from our scheme using the KEM-DEM construction [6,2].
Previous work has identified both identity based key encapsulation mech-
anisms (IB-KEM) [11,5] (see [12] for a comparison) and certificateless key en-
capsulation mechanisms (CL-KEM) [2,10]. However, the known constructions
for CL-KEM schemes are all generic constructions: they involve running a pub-
lic key based encryption scheme and an ID-based KEM in parallel and are thus
not very efficient. In this work we propose the first direct CL-KEM construction
from an efficient IB-KEM in the standard model and prove the construction
secure.
The security model for our CL-KEM construction is similar to that of
previous work by Bentahar et al. [2] and Huang and Wong [10]. We consider a
“weak” certificateless adversary that can replace public keys, but cannot request
decapsulations of a ciphertext under a replaced public key unless the correspond-
ing user secret value is disclosed to the simulator. This is a realistic notion as in
real life one cannot expect a user to successfully decrypt ciphertexts that do not
correspond to the user’s private key. For a full discussion of the security model
see Section 3 on the facing page.
The main contributions of this work are:
– First efficient direct construction for a CCA secure certificateless key encap-
sulation mechanism proven secure in the standard model.
– Simplified proof strategy for certificateless KEM constructions.
– Direct efficient constructions for certificateless CCA secure encryption [2]
and key agreement [4] follow from our construction.
– Approximately twice as efficient as the generic construction by Huang and
Wong.
– Improved security model for certificateless KEM
2 Definitions
2.1 Target Collision Resistant Hash Function
Let F = (TCRs)s∈S be a family of hash functions for security parameter k and
with seed s ∈ S where S is parametrized by the security parameter k. F is said
to be collision resistant if, for a hash function TCR = TCRs with s
$← S, it is
infeasible for an efficient adversary to find two distinct values x 6= y such that
TCR(x) = TCR(y).
The notion of a target collision resistant hash function(TCR) is strictly weaker.
The adversary against a target collision resistant hash function is supplied with
a randomly drawn hash function TCR = TCRs and a randomly chosen element
x. The task of the adversary is to find a y such that TCR(x) = TCR(y). Note
that the adversary may not select x, and is thus limited with respect to collision
resistant hash functions. Target collision resistant hash functions are sometimes
also called universal one-way hash functions. Naor and Yung [14] and Rompel
[15] give efficient constructions for target collision resistant hash functions from
arbitrary one-way functions. In the following we assume that TCR’s exist and
define the advantage of any efficient polynomial time adversary M against a
randomly chosen hash function TCR = TCRs as
Advhash-tcrTCR,M (k) = Pr[y
$←M(TCR(·), x)|TCR(y) = TCR(x)]
The hash function TCR is said to be target collision resistant if the advantage
for all M against TCR is negligible in k.
2.2 Admissible Bilinear Pairing
LetG andGT be groups of prime order p. A bilinear pairings map e : G×G→ GT
between the groups G and GT satisfies the following properties:
Bilinear We say that a map e : G×G→ GT is bilinear if e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for
all g ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp.
Non-degenerate We say that e is non-degenerate if it does not send all pairs in
G×G to the identity in GT . Since G and GT are groups of prime order p, it
follows that if g ∈ G is a generator of G, then e(g, g) is a generator of GT .
Computable There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h) for any g, h ∈ G.
2.3 Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
The decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption states that given {ga, gb, gc} ∈
G3 it is hard to distinguish e(g, g)abc ∈ GT from a random element R $← GT .
Let Z be an algorithm that takes as input a triple {ga, gb, gc, T} ∈ G3 × GT ,
and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} indicating T ?= e(g, g)abc. We define the dBDH
advantage of Z to be
AdvdBDHZ =
∣∣∣Pr [a, b, c $← Zp : Z(ga, gb, gc, T ) = (T ?= e(g, g)abc)]− 1/2∣∣∣
3 Security Model
3.1 Types of certificateless adversaries
In certificateless cryptography it is common to distinguish between two types of
adversaries:
Type I: A Type I adversary represents an outsider adversary that does not
have access to the secret master key of the key generation centre (KGC).
Type II: A Type II adversary represents an insider adversary that has access
to the master secret key (e.g. a malicious KGC).
The security of the scheme is then further classified by the type of decryption
oracle access that the adversary has:
Strong security: The adversary has access to a strong decryption oracle. This
means that the oracle can decrypt ciphertexts even if it does not know the
private key that matches the public key used for encryption. Thus it can
decrypt a ciphertext C ∈ C even if the adversary replaced the certificateless
public key that was used to generate the ciphertext and does not disclose
the matching private key to the decryption oracle.
Weak security: The adversary has access to a weak secret value decryption
oracle (Weak SV Decrypt oracle). The oracle can decrypt ciphertexts only if
it is given all private keys necessary for decryption. If the adversary replaced
a public key, then decryption is only possible if the adversary submits the
private key matching the public key along with the decryption request.
In his survey on certificateless encryption schemes, Dent [8] remarks that
“the Weak [. . . ] [security] model seems to most realistically reflect the potential
abilities of an attacker.” All published CL-KEM schemes [10,2] focus on the weak
security model. We will use this model for our work as well.
3.2 Certificateless Key Encapsulation Mechanism
We use the definition by Huang and Wong [10] for a certificateless key-encapsulation
mechanism (CL-KEM). A certificateless KEM consists of the following algo-
rithms:
CL-KEM IBE Setup: On input 1k where k ∈ N is a security parameter, it
generates a master public/private key pair (mpk,msk).
CL-KEM IBE KeyDerivation: On inputmsk and a user identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗,
it generates a user partial key / ID-based private key skID.
CL-KEM User KeyGen: On input mpk and a user identity ID, it generates
a user public/private key pair (upk, usk).
CL-KEM Key Verification: On input mpk and upk, it generates an encryp-
tion key enck that is used for all following encapsulations. This algorithm
needs to run only if the master public key or the user public key change
(which should happen less frequent than actual encapsulations take place).
CL-KEM Encapsulation: takes as input (mpk, enck, ID) and outputs an en-
capsulation key pair (K,C) ∈ K × E where C is called the encapsulation
of the key K and K and E are the key space and the encapsulation space
respectively.
CL-KEM Decapsulation: takes as input ((skID, usk), ID, C) and decapsulates
C to get back a key K, or outputs the special symbol ⊥ indicating invalid
encapsulation.
3.3 The security game for CL-KEM
To model the security guarantees of a certificateless scheme correctly, we intro-
duce the following model that merges the requirements by Dent [8] and Huang
& Wong [10]. The adversary M has access to the following oracles:
Reveal master key: The adversary is given access to the master secret key.
Reveal ID-based key(ID): The adversary extracts the ID-based private key
of party ID.
Get user public key(ID): The adversary obtains the certificateless public key
for ID. If the certificateless key for the identity has not yet been generated,
it is generated with the user key gen algorithm.
Replace public key(ID, pk): Party ID’s certificateless public key is replaced
with pk chosen by the adversary. All communication (encryption, encapsu-
lation) for Party ID will use the new public key.
Reveal secret value(ID): The adversary extracts the secret value βID, γID that
corresponds to the certificateless public key for party ID. If the adversary
issued a replace public key query for ID before, ⊥ is returned.
Decapsulate(ID, C): The adversary learns the decapsulation of C under ID or
⊥ if C is invalid or if the adversary replaced the public key of ID.
Decapsulate(ID, C, x): The adversary learns the decapsulation of C under ID
using the secret value x. The special symbol ⊥ will be returned if C is invalid.
Get challenge key encapsulation(ID∗): The adversary requests a challenge
key encapsulation and thus marks the transition from Oracles1 to Oracles2
in Experiment 1. The simulator returns a challenge key encapsulation as
described in Experiment 1.
The security game for a CL-KEM scheme is associated with the following ex-
periment:
Experiment Challengecl−kem−ccaCL-KEMM (k) :
(mpk,msk) $← CL-KEM IBE Setup(k)
(ID∗, state) $←MOracles1(find,mpk)
K∗0
$← K; (C∗,K∗1 ) $← CL-KEM Enc(pk, ID∗)
γ
$← {0, 1};K∗ = K∗γ
γ′ $←MOracles2(guess,K∗, C∗, state)
Return γ == γ′
(1)
The advantage an adversary M has against a CL-KEM scheme is therefore
expressed by
AdvCL-KEMM (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [Experiment Challengecl−kem−ccaCL-KEMM (k)]− 1/2∣∣∣
For a Type I adversaryM, Oracles1 and Oracles2 mean access to all oracles
listed above with the following limitations:
1. No reveal master key queries.
2. C∗ must not be submitted to a decapsulate oracle under ID∗.
3. Not both (reveal secret value OR replace public key) AND reveal ID-based
key oracles may be asked for ID∗.
For a Type 2 adversary M, Oracles1 and Oracles2 are subject to the fol-
lowing limitations:
1. Oracles1 and Oracles2 now includes reveal master key as allowed query,
2. C∗ must not be submitted to a decapsulate oracle under ID∗.
3. reveal secret value must never be asked for ID∗,
4. Oracles1 must not include replace public key for ID∗.
4 The CL-KEM scheme
We describe the phases of our certificateless key encapsulation mechanism in this
section. Our protocol consists of six phases: setup, identity based key derivation,
user key generation, key verification,key encapsulation, and key decapsulation.
The algorithms setup, and identity based key derivation are exactly the same
as in Kiltz and Galindo’s KEM [12]. In the following, we first recapitulate the
parameters needed for the Kiltz-Galindo KEM and continue then to describe the
differences needed to obtain a certificateless KEM. We will use bilinear pairings
and Waters hash in the scheme, which we describe shortly.
4.1 Waters’ Hash
To prove our scheme, we use Waters’ hash function H : {0, 1}n → G as described
in Waters’ identity based encryption scheme [17]. On input of an integer n, the
randomized hash key generator HGen(G) chooses n+ 1 random group elements
h0, h1, . . . , hn ∈ G and returns h = (h0, h1, . . . , hn) as the public description of
the hash function. The hash function H : {0, 1}n → G∗ is evaluated on a string
ID = (ID1, . . . , IDn) ∈ {0, 1}n as the product H(ID) = h0
∏n
i=1 h
IDi
i .
4.2 CL-KEM Algorithms
Setup On input of the security parameter k, the key generation center picks
suitable bilinear pairing parameters (e(·, ·), p,G,GT , g) and uses HGen(G) to
obtain a suitable Waters’ hash function. The KGC also publishes system param-
eters (u1, u2, z) ∈ G. See Algorithm CL-KEM IBE Setup in Figure 1 on the
next page for details.
Identity-based Key Derivation To generate an ID-based key for an identity
ID ∈ {0, 1}n, the key generation centre follows the Algorithm CL-KEM IBE
KeyDerivation in Figure 1 on the facing page.
User Key Generation To obtain a certificateless KEM, we introduce the new
algorithm user key generation into the Kiltz-Galindo KEM. The user generates
a certificateless key pair from the system parameters as outlined by Algorithm
CL-KEM User Keygen in Figure 1 on the next page. After key generation,
the user publishes upk and keeps usk private.
CL-KEM IBE Setup(k) :
u1, u2
$← G∗
a, b
$← Zp∗; z ← e(ga, gb)
H
$← HGen(G)
mpk ← (u1, u2, ga, gb, z,H)
msk ← α = gab
Return(mpk,msk)
CL-KEM IBE KeyDer(msk, ID) :
s
$← Zp∗
skID ← (α ·H(ID)s, gs)
Return(skID)
CL-KEM User Keygen(mpk, ID) :
(u1, u2, g
a, gb, z,H)← mpk
βID, γID
$← Zp∗
upk ← (gβID , gγID , gaβID , gbγID)
usk ← βID · γID
Return(upk, usk)
CL-KEM KeyVer(mpk, upk) :
(gβID , gγID , gaβID , gbγID)← upk
(u1, u2, g
a, gb, z,H)← mpk
Check if e(ga, gβID)
?
= e(g, gaβID)
and e(gb, gγID)
?
= e(g, gbγID)
TRUE : enck ← e(gaβID , gbγID)
FALSE : enck
$← GT
Return(enck)
CL-KEM Enc(enck,mpk, ID,M) :
(u1, u2, g
a, gb, z,H)← mpk
r
$← Zp∗
c1 ← gr
c2 ← H(ID)r, t← TCR(c1)
c3 ← (ut1 · u2)r
K ← enckr ∈ GT
C ← (c1, c2, c3) ∈ G3
Return(K,C)
CL-KEM Dec(skID, usk, C) :
c1, c2, c3 ← C
d1, d2 ← skID
r1, r2
$← Zp∗
t← TCR(c1)
K ←
„
e(c1, d1 · (ut1u2)r1 ·H(ID)r2)
e(c2, d2 · gr2)e(gr1 , c3)
«usk
Return(K)
Fig. 1. Our CCA secure CL-KEM.
Certificateless Key Verification We add the new key verification algorithm
to the certificateless KEM. This algorithm makes sure that the master public
key is part of the encryption, and addresses the security issue discovered in [16].
If the master public key is not part of the encryption, key decapsulation will
result in a key that is different from the key generated during encapsulation.
The output of the key verification algorithm is the encapsulation base key enck,
that is then used for key encapsulation.
Certificateless Key Encapsulation We modify the Kiltz-Galindo encapsu-
lation mechanism by using enck instead of z for encryption. Thus we get a
very efficient encapsulation mechanism, outlined by Algorithm CL-KEM Enc
in Figure 1 on the preceding page. The key K is used for encryption, C is the
certificateless encapsulation of K.
Certificateless Key Decapsulation Decapsulation is also very efficient as it
needs only one additional exponentiation over the Kiltz-Galindo KEM decap-
sulation algorithm. The Algorithm CL-KEM Dec in Figure 1 on the previous
page describes the decapsulation.
This concludes the description of the certificateless KEM construction.
5 Efficiency comparison
When compared to the only other CL-KEM in the standard model by Huang
and Wong [10], we note that both key generation and encapsulation are twice
as efficient, we save one exponentiation during decapsulation, key size is smaller
and ciphertext size is approximately halved. On the other hand, we introduce the
new key verification algorithm, which adds 5 pairings. These can be seen as three
fixed-base pairings: regular pairings are e(ga, gβID), e(gb, gγID) and e(gaβID , g),
fixed base from here are e(gbγID , g) (keeping g fixed) and e(gaβID , gbγID) (keeping
gaβID fixed). We suspect that speedups that are available for fixed point multi-
plicaion in elliptic curve cryptography will carry over to the pairings case, using
a memory tradeoff. See Hankerson, Menezes and Vanstone [9, Chapter 3.3.2] for
details in the elliptic curve case. For a detailed comparison of our scheme with
the CL-KEM construction in the standard model by Huang and Wong [10] see
Table 1 on the facing page.
6 Proof of security for the CL-KEM
Theorem 1 Assume TCR is a target collision resistant hash function. Under the
decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption relative to the generator G, the
CL-KEM from Section 4 on page 6 is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Proving the protocol is easier if we do not treat Type I and Type II adversaries
separately. Essentially, there are two strategies for dealing with an adversary:
Scheme KeyGen Enc Dec Keysize Ciphertext
#pairings + #[multi,regular,fixed-base]-exp pk overhead
IB-KEM [12] 0 + [0,2,0] 0 + [1,3,1] 3 + [1,0,2] n+4 3l
+ PKE [13] 0 + [0,4,0] 0 + [0,4,0] 0 + [0,2,0] 4 2l
= CL-KEM [10] 0 + [0,6,0] 0 + [1,7,1] 3 + [1,2,2] n+8 5l
Ours 0 + [0,3,0] 0 + [1,3,1] 3 + [1,1,2] n+4 3l
We instantiate the Huang & Wong [10] scheme with the most efficient CCA2 secure
PKE scheme by Kurosawa & Desmedt [13] and the most efficient CCA2 secure ID-
based KEM by Kiltz & Galindo [12] and compare it to our direct construction from
the Kiltz & Galindo KEM.
Table 1. Comparison of the Huang-Wong scheme with our scheme
– Embed the challenge into the ID-based part. Then the adversary may learn
the secret value or replace the certificateless public key. This is generally not
applicable for Type II adversaries.
– Embed the challenge into the CL-based part. Then the adversary may learn
the ID-based secret key. This is applicable for both Type I and Type II
adversaries.
For Type I adversaries that want to learn the CL-key, we use the proof from
Kiltz and Galindo [12] unmodified and hand over the user secret value xID to
the adversary. The original proof does still hold in this setting.
For Type II adversaries and Type I adversaries that want to learn the ID-
based key, we have to modify the proof. The simulator B gets the dBDH chal-
lenge (g, ga, gb, gc, T ) from its challenger. Given that the adversary M has an
advantage in the CL-KEM game, B uses the adversary M to get an advantage
in solving the dBDH challenge. This strategy simplifies proving the security of
the scheme: a well known proof in the ID-based setting is expanded only with
what is necessary for the certificateless setting. As it turns out, the proof for the
CL-part of the scheme is easier to understand as it does not have to deal with
artificial aborts.
We rewrite the proof by Kiltz and Galindo to get a proof for the CL-KEM
scheme for Type II adversaries. As in Kiltz & Galindo’s paper, the main idea is
again that the simulator knows a back door for the hash function H. Knowing the
back door for H allows the simulator to let H “vanish” for the target identity.
To achieve this, we have to embed the challenge slightly differently from the
original proof by Kiltz and Galindo [12]. We also use a game based approach.
The simulator B starts with knowing the discrete logarithms of ga, gb, gc and
“forgets” the discrete logarithms during modifications of the game.
Game 0.(Forget b) The simulator B picks (a, b, c) $← Zp∗, computes gc and
t∗ = TCR(gc) and additionally picks d, δ $← Zp∗. The CL-KEM IBE Setup
algorithm is modified as follows:
CL-KEM IBE Setup(k) :
γ
$← Zp, u1 = ga, u2 = (ga)−t∗gd, α = gb; z ← e(g, α) = e(g, gb)
H
$← HGen(G)
mpk ← (u1, u2, g1/δ, gbδ, z,H);msk ← α
Return(mpk,msk)
(2)
We assume that the adversaryM makes no more than q0 queries for distinct
identities. One of these identities will be used to create the challenge ciphertext.
We enumerate these queries. The simulator B guesses the index of the target
identity ID∗ that the adversary will use in the test query by selecting q∗ $← Zq0 .
We also assume that the adversary does not make more than q decapsulation
queries. B sets the target identity’s certificateless public key to e(ga, gb) = za.
Both the KGC public key and the master secret key α = gb can be given to the
adversary at the start of the game.
Find Phase. During its execution, M makes a number of reveal master
key, reveal ID-based key, reveal secret value, replace public key, and decapsulate
requests. The simulator deals with the adversary’s queries in the following way:
Get master key: B returns α.
Get user public key(ID): If these requests target an identity that has not
been initialized before, there are two possibilities: If it is the q∗th distinct
query, the simulator picks  $← Zp∗ and returns (ga, g1/, ga/δ, gbδ/). Other-
wise, the simulator generates a new certificateless keys on the fly as specified
by CL-KEM User Keygen, publishes the ID’s certificateless public key
in the directory of certificateless public keys and records the certificateless
private key usk = βID · γID along with the ID in a table (later referred to as
the table of certificateless private keys).
Replace user public key(ID, upkID): The simulator inserts the new certifi-
cateless public key upk′ID into the table of certificateless public keys and
inserts ⊥ into the table of certificateless private keys at position ID.
Reveal ID-based key(ID): (only Type I) As the simulator knows α = gb
these queries can always be answered throughout the game for Type I ad-
versaries. For Type II adversaries, α can be passed to the adversary at the
start of the game. Then it is not necessary to provide this functionality to
the adversary (the adversary may compute the keys on its own).
Decapsulation(C, ID): The simulator returns the decapsulation of C under ID
query using the entry from the table of certificateless private keys or ⊥ if the
certificateless public key was replaced by the adversary or C is an invalid
encapsulation.
Decapsulation(C, ID, x): The simulator returns the decapsulation of C under
ID query using x as the user secret value or ⊥ if C is an invalid encryption.
Eventually, the adversary returns a target identity ID∗. The simulator chooses
a random key K∗0 and runs the encapsulation algorithm to create a key K
∗
1
together with the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3). The challenge ciphertext
is computed as
c∗1 ← gc, t∗ ← TCR(gc), c∗2 = H(ID∗)c, c∗3 = (ut
∗
1 u2)
c
Then, the simulator chooses a random bit b and the challenge ciphertext C∗
is returned together with the key K∗ = K∗b to the adversary.
Guess Phase. The adversary continues to query the oracles provided by the
simulator under the condition that he may not request a decapsulation of C∗
under ID∗ and may not request the user secret value xID∗ . Finally, the adversary
returns a bit b′. If b′ = b then the simulator returns 1, else he returns 0. This
completes the description of the simulator. Let Xi denote the event that the
adversary M wins game i. Thus we have for the advantage of the adversary
against the CL-KEM scheme: Advcl−kem−ccaCL−KEM,M = |Pr[X0]− 1/2|.
Game 1.(Eliminate hash collisions) The simulator fixed c∗1 = g
c and t∗ =
TCR(gc) at the start of the game and aborts if a decapsulation query is made
for any ciphertext C = (c1, c2, c3) for that TCR(c1) = t∗ and c1 6= c∗1. Other-
wise, Game 0 and Game 1 are identical. This event happens only with negligible
probability as otherwiseM could be used as an efficient adversary against TCR.
Thus we have
|Pr[X1]− Pr[X0]| ≤ Advhash-tcrTCR,M (k)
Game 2.(Change of hash keys) The game continues as in Game 1 except that
the simulator changes the way the hash keys h = (h0, h1, . . . , hn) are generated.
Set m = 2q (where q is the upper bound on the decapsulation queries) and
randomly choose
x0, x1, . . . , xn
$← {0, . . . , p− 1}; y′0, y1, . . . , yn $← {0, . . . ,m− 1}
k
$← {0, . . . , n}
(3)
and set y0 ← p− km+ y′0.
B redefines the public hash keys h = {h0, . . . , hn} as hi = gxiuyi1 = gxi(ga)yi
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, the public hash functionH evaluated at identity ID ∈ {0, 1}n
is given by
H(ID) = h0
n∏
i=1
hIDii = g
x(ID)u
y(ID)
1 = g
x(ID)(ga)y(ID)
with x(ID) = x0 +
∑n
i=1 IDixi and y(ID) = y0 +
∑n
i=1 IDiyi (where x() and y()
are only known to the simulator). As this does not change the distribution of
the hash keys, the probability of success for the adversary does not change:
Pr[X2] = Pr[X1]
Game 3.(Abort for wrong challenge identity) The simulation proceeds as in
Game 2. Once the simulator is being asked the challenge ciphertext query, it
checks the ID∗ is the q∗th distinct identity and aborts otherwise. The simulator
also aborts if y(ID∗) 6= 0.
As we do not need to change the key derivation oracle during the sequence
of games (as Kiltz and Galindo do), we can simplify the proof significantly. We
especially do not have to deal with artificial aborts, as the abort probability for
the simulator can be estimated directly using results from Kiltz and Galindo [12,
Section A.2]. From Equation 3 on the preceding page we have that
y(ID∗) = 0 = p− km+ y′0 +
n∑
i=1
ID∗i yi
and from the distribution of the yi we get that
0 ≤ y′0 +
n∑
i=1
ID∗i yi < (n+ 1)m
Thus if y(ID∗) = 0 mod m, then there is a unique 0 ≤ k < n + 1 such that
y(ID∗) = 0 over the integers. Since k is uniformly and independently distributed
over the integers, we get:
Pr[y(ID∗) = 0] = Pr[y(ID∗) = 0 mod p] ≥ Pr[y(ID∗) = 0 mod m]/(n+ 1)
Thus for a fixed k and b ∈ Zm we have that Pr[y(ID) = b mod m] = 1/m. So we
conclude with
Pr[y(ID∗) = 0] ≥ 1
n+ 1
Pr[y(ID∗) = 0 mod m] =
1
n+ 1
· 1
m
=
1
m(n+ 1)
Thus, the probability that Game 3 succeeds is given by the probability that
y(ID∗) = 0 and that ID∗ is the q∗th distinct identity. As there are at most q0
distinct ID queries by the adversary we have
Pr[X3] ≥ Pr[X2]/(q0m(n+ 1))
Game 4.(Change of decapsulation oracle / Forget a) The simulator knows all
user secret keys except for those the adversary replaced with a replace certificate-
less public key request. Regarding decapsulation queries, the simulator does not
have to answer requests for identities that were issued a replace certificateless
public key query unless the adversary supplies the user secret key matching the
replaced certificateless public key. As the simulator can derive ID-based private
keys from the master parameters, answering decapsulation queries for all iden-
tities except ID∗ is easy, as all secret information to do this is readily available
using the standard CL-KEM Dec algorithm as described in Figure 1 on page 7.
The simulator established in Game 3 that y(ID∗) = 0. This enables the
simulator to answer decapsulation queries for ID∗ in the following way: instead
of answering the decapsulation as in CL-KEM Dec in Figure 1 on page 7, the
simulator computes the decapsulations for ID∗ as follows: with u1 = ga, u2 =
(ga)−t
∗
gd and c1 = gr we have
c3 = (ut1u2)
r = ((ga)tg−t
∗agd)r = ((ga(t−t
∗)gd)r = (ca1)
t−t∗ · cd1.
To decapsulate the correct key K, we would like to compute e(ga, gb)r. Thus
knowing gb and computing ca1 = (g
r)a = gra will allow us to compute K by
computing e(gra, gb) = e(g, g)rab:
(
c3/c
d
1
) 1
t−t∗ =
(
(ca1)
t−t∗ · cd1/cd1
) 1
t−t∗
= (ca1)
t−t∗
t−t∗ = ca1 = g
ra
As K = e(ga, gb)r = e(g, g)abr, knowing t = TCR(gr) we can recompute K with
K = e
(
gb,
(
c3/c
d
1
) 1
t−t∗
)
= e(gb, gar) = e(g, g)abr
As this behaviour does not alter the adversary’s view of the game we have
Pr[X4] = Pr[X3]
Game 5.(Modify the challenge / Forget c) The simulator changes its answer
to the get challenge key encapsulation query. Game 3 established that y(ID∗) =
0 mod p, thus the challenger can compute the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3)
as
c∗1 = g
c, c∗2 = (g
c)x(ID
∗), c∗3 = (g
c)d,K = T
where gc and T are given by the challenger before the game starts. Now the
answer of the adversary to the challenge ciphertext is directly related to the
challenge, and thus the simulator has an advantage in solving the dBDH chal-
lenge if the adversary has an advantage in winning the game:
Advcl−kem−ccaCL−KEM,M =
∣∣∣∣Pr[X0]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ 1q0m(n+ 1)AdvdBDHM (k) + Advhash-tcrTCR,M (k)− 12
∣∣∣∣
7 Conclusion
We show how to construct an efficient CL-KEM scheme from an existing ID-
based KEM scheme in the standard model. Our construction requires only one
additional exponentiation during the construction of the certificateless key and
one additional exponentiation during the decapsulation compared to the original
ID-based KEM scheme and is thus more efficient than any generic construction
that has been published before. By modifying the Kiltz-Galindo KEM scheme
[12] which is one of the most efficient ID-based KEM schemes in the standard
model, we obtain the most efficient CL-KEM scheme in the standard model
today.
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